





The Beginning of the Breakup of Yugoslavia – 
Kosovo as starting point
Besim Qeriqi1
This paper contains a chronological summary and analyzes the 
process of beginning of the Breakup of Yugoslavia in relation to 
the events in Kosovo during the period 1981-1989. Its aim is to 
present through an objective approach the main causes that led to 
the beginning of the Breakup of Yugoslavia, with Kosovo as starting 
point. The methodology of this paper includes the reflection of the 
main events in form of a comparative analysis, by comparing the 
attitudes of a considerable number of international and local authors 
(Albanian, Croatian, Serbian) including here historians, diplomats, 
politicians, journalists, and so forth, with some of them having been 
direct followers of this period. Sources: a selection of special literature 
has been made, such as: scientific articles, monograph publications, 
documentaries, and so forth.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Autonomy, Conflict, Serbian 
Nationalism, Milošević regime.
1. Introduction
The Breakup of Yugoslavia did not occur overnight. In fact, at the time 
of its establishment on 1st December 1918, it contained many dilemmas. 
From the very beginning this process was followed with major problems, 
starting with the fact that it was seen more as a political program rather 
than a reality that would be implemented into practice.
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First, although the three respective initiating nations were of Slavic ori-
gin and had some common elements, the distinctions between them were 
not insignificant. Croatians and Slovenians had always showed sympathy 
for a self-governing system, they were catholic, and their past was linked 
to the western world because for a long time they have been under the 
Austro-Hungarian rule. On the other side there were the Serbs who were 
Orthodox and with clear dominant ambitions. Their mentality was related 
more to the eastern world, a fact that was influenced by the centuries-old 
rule of Ottomans.
 The second problematic issue was the exclusion of other nationalities 
that were not small in terms of population, such as: Albanians, Bosnians, 
Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Italians, and so forth. Thus, being 
denied, the majority of these populations had lived under the shadow of 
the nationalism in their national states.
 If we analyze this issue from the Kosovo-Albanian perspective, the 
problem appears quite clear. Kosovo Albanians had become part of this 
combination unwillingly being unjustly separated from the Albanian state 
(28 November 1912), although it was globally known that Kosovo had 
nothing in common with other populations of the Federate, and were dif-
ferentiated clearly by language, culture, traditions, religions, and so forth. In 
such context, the separation had left significant marks in Kosovo-Albanians 
during the Serbian-Yugoslavic rule. Several historical sources speak of 
the violence, persecution, murder, continuous imprisonment and not only: 
schools in Albanian were not allowed; Albanian language, books and writ-
ing was strictly prohibited! This policy contained in itself assimilation 
and colonization through two main instruments: first, placement of Slavs 
in Kosovo and the expulsion of Albanians.2 Within this ongoing policy, 
Albanians, being called second-hand citizens, faced a ferocious campaign 
of denationalization and mass expulsion from their native lands. Despite 
the restrictions imposed upon them, Albanians never surrendered. They had 
consistently rejected the Yugoslavian state. As a result of these continuous 
objections there arose a new opportunity: The Constitution of 1974, where-
fore for Kosovo-Albanians the period 1968-1981 marks a cultural renais-
sance followed by a social, political and national emancipation, followed by 
the opening the main cultural and national institutions such the University, 
Academy, etc., contributing to the establishment of an intellectual Albanian 
elite which in the forthcoming decades would enable the expression of the 
ethnic identity of Albanians, thus becoming the cornerstone of the state of 
2 For more details see Nacertainije and Nacionalism by Ilija Garšanin and The Expulsion 
of the Albanians by Vaso Čubrilović, Memorandum of SANU.
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Kosovo. However, this achievement was not the goal itself, the expecta-
tion of Kosovo-Albanians. Their main demand was equality with other 
people of the republics for as long as the Federate would function or at 
best reunion with Albania.
The objective of this study is the issue of Kosovo-Albanians in the 
process of Yugoslavian break-up. The issues addressed are: The rise of 
nationalism and the 1981 protests; Debatable Migrations, Memorandum of 
SANU in service of increasing Serbian nationalism; Slobodan Milošević 
rise to power; abolition of Kosovo’s Autonomy; Gazimestan the place of 
battels and myths. All these issues that contributed in the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia.
2. The Rise of Nationalisms – The Protests of 1981
In the late 1970s, economic problems within the federation grew every-
day more. The death of Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980 
further complicated matters, leaving a huge political vacuum. Dissatisfaction 
was evident, thus increasing inter-ethnical tension, marking the moments of 
Yugoslavia’s decline. In this context, in the mid-1980s, the card of national-
ism had already been lit up and, unfortunately, it spread almost throughout 
the whole federation. The picture seemed clear. It was used to incite politi-
cal, economic and cultural problems, phenomena that the Yugoslav society 
was experiencing and demanding as necessary changes. The challenge 
faced by the peoples of the Federation was the use of "involvement" with 
the "national cause" for which divergences were so great that the media 
propaganda managed to promote it, increasing the mythological basis of a 
community through the production of metaphors for populist use, which 
had long been silenced by the 35 year rule of Tito.
 Judging from the Serbian viewpoint, the instigation of nationalism had 
begun with Kosovo. More precisely, in March 1981, less than a year after 
Tito’s death, protests burst out in Kosovo. These protest came as a surprise 
for the political leadership and the public in general. Later, party and fed-
eral authorities blamed the Albanian leadership for not being strict enough 
in the fight against Albanian nationalism. (Pavlović, 2019) On the other 
hand, Dušan T. Batakovic, (2006) sees the Albanian uprising as carefully 
prepared and orchestrated in March and April 1981. Initially, it was like a 
genuine student revolt, evolving within few weeks into a broad nationalist 
movement demanding the status of seventh federal state of Kosovo within 
Yugoslavia. The requested status included the right to self-determination 
and the constitutional provisions reserved for all other respective republics 
within the Federation. This request was made in 1981, one year after Tito’s 
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death, and as such, the Albanian request disturbed the fragile balance of 
power in the federal leardership and challenged the stability of the entired 
system established in 1974.
 On the other hand, Albanians had continuosly expressed their dissatis-
fation related to the disregard that they were experiencing in terms of eco-
nomic development and their sublime request for the Republic of Kosovo. 
However it is a fact that Yugoslavia was facing a major economic decline at 
the end of the 70s and the beginning of the 80s. For Kosovo as the poorest 
state of the Federation, this was a signal of collapse thus further complicat-
ing the situation. In fact, Kosovo was experienceing severe political and 
economic problems. The region inhabited by Albanians was characterized 
by a backwardness in all aspects, whether resulting from its historical past; 
whether from the negative political treatment and negligence; unequallity 
in terms of education; poor standard of living, and so forth, thus being cat-
egorized as second-hand citizens. In these circumstances, Albanians had 
no other choice but to express their dissatisfaction about the disregard that 
they were experiencing in terms of economic development. According to 
Noel Malcolm, (1998) there existed a significant ethnic inequality: Serbs 
and Montenegrins who made up only 15% of the population, had 30% of 
jobs. Another fact that is empahised by Austrian authors W. Petritsch and R. 
Pichler, (2002) is that Albanian students after graduating had almost no pros-
pect of being employed. Therefore, this dissatisfaction took an economic 
and social character, political liberalization, and their main demand-equal 
status with other Yugoslav nationalities. This issue has been at its best 
articulated through the great historical turn of protests starting on spring 
of 1981 by the students of the University of Prishtina, whose main a cause 
was the poor meal being served to them in the student refectory. This 
event had its impact in the community wherefore within a short period of 
time the protest was joined by citizens, workers, pupils, and so forth, thus 
expanding all though Kosovo. Undoubtedly, this fact greatly disturbed the 
Serbo-Yugoslavian government, which took immediate action, mobilizing 
special police force and security units from various parts of Yugoslavia.
 The response of the Yugoslav government was tendentious as usual, 
without analyzing the real causes of the protests, prejudicing and striving 
to put Kosovo Albanians in a position against all the other peoples of the 
Federation. Their conclusion was that the basic Albanian request for a 
Republic was an attempt to "destroy the constitutional system of socialist 
Yugoslavia" (Lalaj, 2000).
 Although the protests were violently suppressed by Yugoslavian military 
police forces, the event had already left its marks. Thus, as a response, since 
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the beginning of the 80s and onwards, Serbs had begun to express their 
concern about the supposed discrimination and intimidation that according 
to them each day more elements of hostility were being expressed from 
the majority of Albanian population towards the minority of Serbs and 
Montenegrins. This approach had begun to appear in various Belgrade 
media. About such views, in June of 1982 the Serbian theologian Atanasije 
Jevtić published an article with the content: "today one, tomorrow seven, 
the day after tomorrow each of us", this was the uncompromised slogan of 
Albanian "irredentists" for Kosovo Serbs published in press, whose aim was 
to proclaim the end of Serbs in Kosovo. He further states that "Albanian 
Nazis have made such threats for decades that were often associated with 
drastic acts, physical and psychological violence and even public crimes 
against the innocent Serbian population" (Radiç, 1999). Such writings 
begun to contribute to the continuous deterioration of the situation, such as 
the burial of Serbian radical Ranković in 1983 which turned into a national-
ist event due to the fact that accodring to them he was the greatest defender 
of serbisation in Kosovo. To further nationalize the issue this case served 
as a casus belli to express their dissatisfaction and manifest public protests. 
The issue in question had its own impact, managing to be one of the main 
media-journalistic topics in Belgrade.
3. Debatable Migrations
 At the end of 80s, the card of nationalism was the main topic among 
serbs, a phenomenon that was especially noticed among Serbs that lived 
outside of Serbia. They (serbs) were feeling more and more isolated and 
threatened from the nationalism arising in places where they were living 
such as Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Undoubtedly the most active in this 
issue were the Kosovo Serbs. In this context, for a long time they had been 
instrumentalised by Belgrade with the complaint that they were being 
oppressed and maltreated every day more by Albanians and they were 
being forced to leave Kosovo. Such was the case of Jorge Martinović, a 
56 year old farmer from Gjilan who had declared that he had been attacked 
by two Albanians who had put a bottle in his anus. For Serbs, this incident 
came to be the main national event, coming to the final conclusion that 
Albanians were allegedly mistreating, raping, and evicting the Serbian 
population. This case was confirmed as a manipulated one by a Serbian 
doctor and a judge, but nevertheless the Belgrade media had not stopped 
the propaganda. However, this event had already made its effects, since 
the international authors, relying mostly in Serbian sources, came to the 
conclusion that a considerable number of Serbian population, having no 
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other choice, had to leave their homes.3 However, when we talk about the 
migration process, we can argue that it was a global phenomenon continu-
ously faced by many countries. Being quite a complex phenomenon, it is 
difficult to controle or even prevent it entirely. Victor Meyer, a close fol-
lower of the events in former Yugoslavia, states: ""It cannot be denied that 
the 'Albanian Renaissance' in Kosovo was accompanied by a continuous 
departure of Serbs and Montenegrins." (Meyer, 1999) According to Hivzi 
Islami, (1990) a number of Serbs and Montenegrins began to migrate from 
Kosovo due to the insecurity coming from the history of maltreatment and 
injustice that the Albanians had experienced in the times of deformations 
"especially those of Ranković’s state apparatus", and due to the loss of privi-
leges they had before 1966, but above all, the Serbs and Montenegrins could 
not tolerate being equal to Albanians. In this regard, there is no evidence 
grounded in facts that Albanians as a majority have discriminated Serbs 
and Montenegrins. On the contrary, statistical data speak of favorization 
of Serbians and Montenegrins in all public institutions.
Table no.1 shows the percentage of employees in public institutions 
based on ethnicity in Kosovo during 1971-1981.
 In this regard, it seems paradoxical to speak unilaterally about the 
migration of Serbs and Montenegrins without mentioning the migration 
of Albanians and its causes. For Albanians involved in politics, the period 
after the protests started to get very difficult as they were being consist-
ently persecuted and many were being imprisoned for political reasons by 
the Yugoslavian authorities led by the UDB (Yugoslavian Secret Service). 
Amnesty International Report (1988) had reported on the political imprison-
ment of Albanians in its annual reports of 1982-1989 where it emphasized 
the difficult situation of Albanians in Yugoslavia. According to official sta-
tistics, between January 1981 and September 1988, 1.750 ethnical Albanians 
were sentenced by political crime courts. In addition, it is estimated that 
7.000 Albanians were imprisoned for minor political activities. Most of 
the defendants were accused for being involved in activities in support of 
3 For more details on this issue see: Malcolm, Noel (1998). Kosovo A short History. 
Prishtinë: Koha, pp. 352-362.; Clark, Howard (2000.) Civil Resistance in Kosovo. 
London: Pluto Press, pp. 16-18.; Judah, Tim (2002). Kosovo war and Revenge. Prishtinë: 
Koha, pp. 67-71.; Vickers, Miranda (2004). Midis Serbëve dhe Shqiptarëve një Histori 
e Kosovës. Tirana: Toena, pp. 261-276.; Glenny, Misha (2007). Histori e Ballkanit 
1804-1999, Nacionalizmi, Luftërat dhe Fuqitë e Mëdha. Tirana: Toena, pp. 625-626.; 
Schmit, Oliver Jens (2012). Kosova – Histori e shkurtër e një treve qendrore ballkanike. 
Prishtinë: Koha, pp. 234-242.
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the demand for Kosovo to become a republic within Yugoslavia or for its 
eventual union with Albania.4
 Such a situation resulted in a number of Albanians being forced to leave 
for Western Europe (1981-1999) as e result of severe economic difficulties 
or because of the continuous political persecution and imprisonment for 
political motives. In relation to this, the data show that economical migra-
tions of Albanians were unorganized and illegal. Although after 1964 the 
predominant feature of economic and political emigration was legalization 
with temporary work. In this aspect, migrant workers grew in proportion 
to the increasing difficulties of the life within the province. According 
to "Rilindja" newspaper, in 1979, it was estimated that there were about 
65.000 Kosovo-Albanian emigrants working in Western Europe with tens 
of thousands others in USA, Australia and Canada. (Lalaj, 2000) Until the 
end of the 20th century, these figures had increased tremendously, and 
it was estimated that between 120.000 and 200.000 Kosovo Albanians 
lived in Switzerland alone, while 250.000 up to 400.000 others were set-
tled in Germany. (Schmit, 2012) Regarding these discussions about the 
process of migration, Marina Blagojević (1999), criticizing the politics of 
the Serbian regime, ascertains: The public and international politics have 
never taken seriously the problem of Serbian and Montenegrin migration. 
In fact, Serbian historiography has managed to take advantage of its "sci-
entific" preponderance giving its own perspective on this matter. Based 
on our research, it turns out that there are no authors who have written 
even a short article about Kosovo and have not written about the process 
of so-called "forced mass migration of Kosovo Serbs". The truth is that 
the vast majority of these articles have expressed their dilemmas about 
the real reason for migration or maltreatment as in the case of Martinović. 
Furthermore, Blagojević emphasizes that the Serbian side, represented 
politically by the regime, never articulated an adequate and acceptable 
explanation for foreigners. The Serbian issue of Kosovo in the 70s, as a 
human rights issue, it was instead sent forward as a purely ethnic conflict 
embedded in history. On the contrary, this was to strengthen the Albanian 
argument along the same lines. The result was that Kosovo was not being 
treated as an issue of human rights and of underdevelopment, therefore 
the interpretations provided by each party led to radicalism and conflict. 
Moreover, Serbs brought the problem to the attention of international com-
munity too late, when the international community had already molded 
an opinion of who was the victim and who was to be blamed. Subsequent 
4 Amnesty International Report January – December, (1989). Easton Street. London WC1 
X 8D, United Kingdom, p. 243.
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events in the 90s and especially the genocide acts of Serbian regime made 
the Albanian claims a self-fulfilling prophecy. One issue that sparked debate 
was the high birth rate of Albanians, for which Serbian circles concluded 
that it was a deliberate and planned process! It is a fact that Albanians have 
had the highest birth rate in Europe. Miranda Vickers (1998) provides a 
statistic that the years 1961-1981 in Kosovo were followed by major demo-
graphic changes. From 2/3 of the population in 1961, Albanians doubled 
while Serbs and Montenegrins from ¼ of its population lowered to 1/6 of 
it. Vickers furthers her argument, on the basis of the 1971 census which 
estimated that Albanians comprised 73.6% of the population in Kosovo. 
As it is shown in the graphical table below, through these years, the natural 
rate of population growth in Yugoslavia per 1.000 inhabitants was quite 
different compared to Kosovo.
Table No.2 shows a statistics of 1961-1981 on population growth.
 Furthermore, there were interpretations that such a decision for rapid 
reproduction was a deliberate decision by Albanians in order to change the 
demographic image of Kosovo (Pavlović, 2013). Such a political mindset 
led to the conclusion that Kosovo women were called "washing machines" 
while the children born and even those yet unborn were called national-
ists and Albanian separatists - a clear racist approach. On the other hand, 
Ekrem Avdić (2013) provides a detailed explanation about the economic 
reasons for the migration of the non-Albanian population. According to 
him, during these times there were Albanian families that had up to 200 
members. Facing such a situation, there had been a great demand for land, 
thus the price of real estate increased enormously. These facts encouraged 
the non-Albanian population to migrate, because for a modest house and 
land in Kosovo you could buy a villa in Serbia sparing a modest sum of 
money. In this context the rules are clear. Albanians bought what they 
needed while others sold. However, it was surprising that during this whole 
process, when Serbs were settled in Serbia they delclared that they where 
being expelled by the Albanians. This process made it clear that the real 
aim was encouraging propaganda through television programs, articles, 
that serbs where being violently forced to leave Kosovo. Geert – Heinrich 
AHRENS, (2007) a well-known German diplomat who was very familiar 
with the political circumstances in former Yugoslavia, when speaking about 
the Serbian political campaign of years 1985 and 1986 and the demands of 
Serbo-Montenegrins for the authorities in Belgrade, among other things, 
mentions the petition addressed to the federal parliament signed by 216 
intellectuals from the circle of D. Ćosić, who would later be understood to 
be the same intellectuals that would draft the Memorandum.
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4. The Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts in service of increasing Serbian nationalism
 Owing to this kind of policy, the intellectual Serbian elite and espe-
cially a part of Academy of Sciences and Arts as well as the Serbian writ-
ers association had begun to act. Intentionally or not, on September 24, 
1986, the Belgrade newspaper "Večernje novosti" published a strategic 
document called "MEMORANDUM". The document contained 10 main 
points describing the economic, political and social situation in Serbia and 
its population in general within the federation. The document presented the 
instructions, the paths that the Serbian leadership should follow to stop the 
so-called persecution of Serbian population. It was t for the first time pub-
licly stated there that the establishment of Tito’s Yugoslavia had severally 
damaged the Serbian nation. According to the decisions of the temporary 
war-time parliament gathered in the Bosnian town Jajca which was tempo-
rarily liberated in 1943, the post-war Yugoslav state would be a federation 
with six equal republics and two autonomous provinces. According to the 
Memorandum, the decisions of that meeting were not legal and damaged 
the Serbs (Tomašević, 2009). Point 8 highlights the expulsion of the Serbian 
population from Kosovo, considering it as a spectacular evidence of their 
historic defeat. Building on the argument that in spring 1981 the Serbian 
people were declared a special war, one which was open and general, there-
fore physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serbian popu-
lation of Kosovo and Metohija was the biggest defeat in the liberation wars 
that Serbian had from 1804 until the uprising of 1941. Therefore, the equal 
national relations in Kosovo and Metohija for which the Serbian warriors 
fought the most, are being extinguished, blaming the Albanians entirely. 
In this regard, with its clear actions the Albanian nationalists began to turn 
the opposite (Surroi, 2019) According to medical professor Mirko Simić 
(2013), a member of Serbian Academy that has been living in London for 
years, in an interview with ‘’Radio Evropa e Lirë’’, recalls the purpose of 
the Memorandum and the reasons for his opposition. According to Simić, 
the Memorandum was basically the idea that a Greater Serbia should be 
created: wherever there is a Serb community, it should join Serbia and form 
a whole in which all Serbs will live in one state. Arguing on his opposition, 
Prof. Simić points out that the main wrongdoing brought by the Serbian 
Memorandum was the expulsion of tens of thousands of Serbs from Croatia, 
the Srebrenica genocide and the tragic events in Kosovo. As a conclusion, 
he states that the Memorandum is not a "bright spot" of Serbian history, but 
more of a "black spot" which hardly will be forgotten or erased. This argu-
ment lies on the fact that the Memorandum was characterized by a critical 
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approach to everything that happened, and that there was almost nothing 
that did not deserve criticism from the position of strategy and theory of 
social action, that led to a division that became easily visible (Madzar, 
1999) Misha Glenny (2000), a journalist familiar with the circumstances 
in the former Yugoslavia, points out that in its main focus was that Kosovo 
Serbs where on the verge of being exterminated by the aggressive Albanians. 
Following the aims of this document, Ekrem Avdić, a well-known Bosnian 
journalist who was closely following the events of that time, wrote among 
other things, that this strategic document was for the creation of Greater 
Serbia which came to be implemented with tanks and artillery by Slobodan 
Milošević. What has been otherwise called My War, lists the conspirators 
against the Serbian people, such as Albanians, Croats, and Bosnians, etc. 
(Avdić, Vllasi, 2013). A clear description of the Memorandum Aims was 
given by Branimir Anzulović, (1999). The document is dominated by the 
idea that Serbs must take whatever action is necessary to bring all Serbs into 
a state as protection against further attempts to annihilate them: establishing 
full national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people, regardless of the 
republic or province they live in, it is their historical and democratic right. 
Achieving equal status and independent development had a deeper meaning 
for the Serbian people. In less than fifty years, during two successful gen-
erations, it was twice exposed to physical annihilation, forced assimilation, 
conversion, cultural genocide, ideological indoctrination, devaluation and 
rejection of its tradition under an inducted complex. The fact that every-
thing was analyzed is noted through the meeting held on June 28, 1985 by 
the Commission for Drafting the Memorandum, the same date as St.Vitus 
Day/ "Vidovdan" which is viewed by the Serbian historiography as the day 
of fate; a day that has been ingrained in the collective consicoussness of the 
Serbs as the day of their "great national catastrophe". This connection is 
early rooted and related to the Battle of Kosovo (1389). Then, on the same 
day (28 June 1914 according to the Georgian Calendar) the assassination of 
Austro-Hungarian heir Franz Ferdinand took place, whose part was Vaso 
Čubrilović, the author of "The Expulsion of Arnauts" and a participant at 
SASA meetings. This kind of language used at a time when nationalism 
was rising day after day can rightly be considered as a poison that acts 
slowly and that in due time will poison all. This approach was more than 
conscious with the aim of mental devastation of the opponent or the "third" 
which was different in ethnicity or religious basis. The aim was submission 
by choosing forms of propagandistic slogans that most of the Serbs came 
to believe (Hoxhaj, 2008).
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 Further on, the nationalism articulated by the Serbian intellectual elite 
was aimed at realizing Serbian politics with its mission to extinguish, assim-
ilate and displace Albanians and other neighboring people with special 
emphasis on Croats and Bosnians. The misfortune of all this was that it had 
found a general support within the population of not only those involved 
in politics. This is best reflected in a description of former US Ambassador 
in Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman (1989 & May 1992). Among other things, 
he emphasizes: it is not worth rejecting those murmurs of intellectuals, they 
were predominant throughout the Serbian society, from vendors, village 
farmers to journalists. Recalling a personal meeting with a Serbian art 
historian, in his question of how would she resolve the Kosovo issue, she 
answered: "Very simply. I would line up all Albanians behind a wall and 
shoot them." (Judah, 2002).
5. The Rise of Milošević to Power
 In the new circumstances, the demands of the Serbian people were very 
clear: they wanted a leader who would respond to their demands for change, 
a leader who would openly and unreservedly support them. In this situation, 
the best choice was Slobodan Milošević. He had been preparing for power 
since the mid 80s and one of his first objectives was media manipulation. 
Aware of the importance and impact of propaganda, he soon took control 
of the Serbian state television and the most influential newspaper "Politika". 
He saw the media as an essential instrument for his rule, since through 
media and its manipulation it would be easier to control the party, security 
services, the army, the academy, etc., which in the end would all become 
his tools. This plan, behind which it was thought to be his mentor Dobrica 
Čosić, turned out to be successful. Having all these powerful mechanisms, 
Milošević begun to play the card of great Serbian expansionist nationalism 
on the grounds that Serbs are the largest people in Yugoslavia and as such 
must dominate a centralized federation led by Serbs. Thanks to this policy, 
Serbs thought of taking advantage of the slight constitutional changes (for 
economic reform) initiated by the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1986. On the other hand, Serbian propaganda through vari-
ous writings had long begun to proclaim as necessary the idea of constitu-
tional changes related to the provinces. The aim of it was clear, to pave the 
legal way for subordination and later for the abolition of autonomy (of 
Kosovo, March 23, 1989). Furthermore, as noted by Susan L. Woodward, 
(1996) the Serbian leadership aided by the Federal Presidency, had attempted 
to follow a less radical way for preventing Kosovar separatists who gained 
popular support in the Albanian community by isolating leaders in order 
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to avoid an open disagreement. At the same time, Ivan Stambolić tried to 
resist the pressure coming from the population and the Serbian parliament 
to take a hard line on Albanians and protect the Serbian minority. Although, 
the same had accused Slovenia and Croatia for supporting Kosovo Albanians 
who refused to discuss reform efforts. International followers of the events 
in Serbia point out that: Serbian analysts, journalists and publicists defend-
ing the Serbian cause begun to write various articles the main content of 
which was: Serbs were suffering genocide; any act of violence against Serbs 
was seen as an ethnically motivated case. However, there is a consensus 
among international authors that Milošević’s rise begins in Kosovo. 
Miroslav Šolević, the Serbian representative in Kosovo, noted in the BBC 
Documentary "The Death of Yugoslavia", that to say that it is not correct 
to say that we put him in power. But that we made of him a true leader, this 
is evident. (Percy, Macqueen, 1995) (Avdic, Vllasi, 2013) On the other 
hand, the Serbian communist leader Ivan Stambolić recalls that when deal-
ing with political issues he had managed to avoid all possible dangers and 
in this respect Milošević posed no danger to him. He further emphasizes 
that – his friends (party associates B.Q.) had suggested that he visits Kosovo. 
In this case he selected Milošević to represent him in a meeting with Kosovo 
Serbs with the aim of relaxing the interethnic conflict that was growing 
day by day in the province. (Percy, Macqueen, 1995). In fact, his selection 
came as a result of an unsatisfactory meeting he had had some time earlier 
with local Serbs in Kosovo. Such a selection turned out to be completely 
wrong, because within a short time it turned out that Milošević ended 
Stambolić’s political career. In the context of these developments, Azem 
Vllasi, Kosovo’s political leader at that time, described the political situa-
tion as fragile. In the national circles in Belgrade, the issue of Kosovo and 
the claim against Albanians was one that would easily gain the support of 
Serbs. Also, the supposedly difficult position of Serbs in Kosovo whom 
Serbia must protect would easily come at hand in realizing this political 
propaganda. (Avdiç, Vllasi, 2013). Thanks to this policy, the Serbian com-
munity in Kosovo had invited Milošević for a visit on April 20th 1987. In 
fact, this turned out to be more of a pulse-measure and an opportunity for 
organization because the discussion in itself was brief and Milošević and 
the Serbian locals agreed to meet again four days later in Fushë Kosova. 
In order for this event to have the desired effect, the Serbian nationalist 
circles had received orders from Belgrade, from Milošević’s inner circle, 
that only Serbs should be part of the event, and should make as many com-
plaints of dissatisfaction as possible, anger, etc., elements these that could 
be served as "red meat" for Serbian media propaganda now controlled by 
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Milošević. Taking advantage of the constant complaints of Serbs in Kosovo 
about how they were being mistreated, raped and deported, Milošević man-
aged to win the crowd. In this context, the case of the Serbian representative 
in Kosovo, Miroslav Solević, proves this fact, who while expressing the 
anger in Milošević’s presence complained with the words: "We must stop 
this Serbian exodus, we must stop this flux of people or otherwise there 
will be no Serbs left… we have a great desire to live here. But we don’t 
like this, no, no." Such extreme complaints were many. Another participant 
said: "Mr. President, we Serbs know Azem Vllasi and others since Tito’s 
days, we know the Communist Party who have not done anything for us 
in 20 years." (Percy, Macqueen, 1995). Thus, any Serb who accused and 
complained about violence and maltreatment by Albanians was frenetically 
applauded. Hearing one by one "the concerns" from the mass gathered in 
Fushë Kosova on 24th April 1987, an event that had followed with clashes 
between protesting Serbs and local police with a stern intimidation, 
Milošević approached the crowd holding a speech that would become one 
of his historical speeches: "No one should dare to beat you…" thus manag-
ing to gain the support of all Serbian people, especially the Serb minority 
living in Kosovo. His speeches already found support everywhere at the 
numerous meetings that were organized, such as the one held in Belgrade 
in the presence of thousands of people, some of whom were from Kosovo, 
where he would state: "Every nation has a love that warms its heart forever, 
for Serbia it is Kosovo" (Malcolm, 1998). These words were broadcasted 
several times in Serbian media in order to further arouse Serbian national-
ism, which mostly served him, and the political analyst for Balkan’s Janusz 
Bugajski (2006) emphasizes the fact that Milošević had already placed 
most of the Belgrade media under his strict control. However, the ordinary 
viewers had no idea that the local Serbians in Kosovo had provoked the 
police and that their complaints were fabricated by Serbian propaganda 
and that Milošević’s myth was built on a lie. This is best evidenced on a 
simple analysis that in addition to those requests that where constantly 
being fabricated the main demand of Kosovo Serbs towards the Serbian 
leadership had to do with the overthrow of the 1974 Constitution. Kosovo 
had gained the right to self-governance for which Serbs had never seemed 
to agree and their main goal was the complete subjugation of Kosovo under 
the slogan "Kosovo is the heart of Serbia." Of course, there were also other 
economic and social demands. The truth is that if one compared the life of 
a Serb who has lived in Serbia with that in Kosovo, there was a significant 
difference in the way of life. However, these facts show the real situation 
in Kosovo where the Yugoslav policy dominated by Serbs had deliberately 
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put aside the process of economic development thus remaining the most 
underdeveloped part within the Federation. In this context, all the citizens 
of Kosovo were facing this difficult socio-economic situation including 
the Albanians who were the absolute majority with over 90%. This fact is 
confirmed by the British Journalist Tim Judah, who provides an annual 
statistic of year 1979 that shows the difficult economic situation of Kosovo 
indicating also the average income per capita. For further details, see table 
no. 3. (Judah, 2002)
 However, the effect of the meeting in Fushë Kosova, and other succes-
sive meetings, elaborated and detailed by the media had raised Milošević’s 
popularity on pedestal, making him the main political figure in Serbia. Now, 
this paved the way for him to take control of the party. Zoran M. Marković 
(1996) states that although the initial instances of nationalism date back 
to 1986, it was clearly articulated politically only at the 8th Session of the 
Central Committee of the Serbian Socialist Party (September 23 and 24, 
1987). On the other hand, Dušan Bataković, (2006) accuses Albanian nation-
alism, among others, for bringing Slobodan Milošević to power in 1987.
 The Albanian challenge to both Serbia and Yugoslavia led to other 
inevitable interethnic conflicts. Whereas, Ivan Stambolić recalls meeting 
Milošević after his return from Kosovo: "He was very enthusiastic, we dis-
cussed and he seemed pathetic as he was shouting "it’s our homeland". On 
the other side, Milošević: "The Kosovo Albanians are doing this because the 
province was virtually a Republic where the local council had the power to 
implement what I defined as a Nazis policy." (Percy, Macqueen, 1995). The 
main disagreement at the meeting was between the faction led by Slobodan 
Milošević who had already experienced the intoxicating scent of the pop-
ulism during its appearance in Fushë Kosovë in April of that year, and the 
line followed by Ivan Stambolić who demanded the use of "legal meth-
ods" and showed the risk of using Serbian nationalism (Blagojevic, 1999). 
Dragiša Pavlović, party leader in Belgrade, a supporter of Stambolić, deliv-
ered a speech against nationalist demagogy: "Recently some friends have 
made anti-communist speeches claiming to offer a solution to Kosovo’s 
problem…some people do not seem to understand that talking in such terms 
can cause escalation of violence". However, the course of events did not 
favorize them, and the faction who wanted a "quick solution" for the Kosovo 
issue won. Milošević had already taken over the party’s leadership. In this 
regard, at the end of September 1987, Milošević forced Dragiša Pavlović 
to leave the party and a little later (in December 1987) the same happened 
to his mentor Ivan Stambolić who is said that was murdered on August 25, 
2000 by order of Milošević (Percy, Macqueen, 1995).
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 Now Milošević’s path was open, his goal was to gain power over 
Yugoslavia, alluding to the amandment of the 1974 Constitution with a par-
ticular foucs on removing the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. However, 
in order to achieve this goal, he first had to solve the issue with the political 
leaders in Prishtina, Novi Sad and also Podgorica. Milošević continued to 
follow a tactics of attracting masses, a tactic that he used successfully in 
1987. Through these meetings, which begun in small groups some of which 
came from Kosovo, but were steadily increasing from 10.000 up to 1 mil-
ion where protesters often were payed by their employers or often came 
from employees who had no work to do (Woodward, 1996). Azem Vllasi 
recalls those rallies. They were a group of Serbs from Kosovo travelling in 
a bus full of Milošević portraits with banners and placards with primitive 
content and hate speech, ridiculing those public personalities who ven in 
indirect ways had expressed their disagreement with Milošević’s politics 
(Avdiç, Vllasi, 2013). The ridicule of public figures was confirmed during 
the rally on November 20, 1988 in Belgrade, while Milošević was delivering 
a speech, in the background there were shoutings: Arrest Vllasi! ", while he 
pretended as if he was not hearing them well, and said: "Ne čujem se baš 
dobro." (I’m not hearing you very well) but I will respond to your request 
that those who deceive the people, those who conspire against Yugoslavia 
will be arrested and punished (Percy, Macqueen, 1995). Although the course 
of events went in favor of the Serbian leader’s rallies, the propaganda had 
had its effects despite all the resistance and Vojvodina’s party leadership 
was resigning; the same was done with Montenegro, where he overthrew 
its leadership and replaced them with his servile supporters. But his main 
concern was undoubtedly Kosovo.
 6. The Abolition of Autonomy
 The dominance of Milošević in Yugoslavian Politics was growing. In 
fact, its leaders had begun a kind of subjugation to the pressure, and propa-
ganda and in some cases by their own servility and opportunism to maintain 
their positions and the privileges that official positions offered. Thanks to 
this policy, the Yugoslavian leadership had blamed the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership as responsible for the "open outburst of counter-revolution". 
This attitude is justified by the fact that a number of politicians within the 
federation, regardless of the republics they lived in, cherished an opinion 
that Milošević should be allowed to take the "bones" called Kosovo and 
Vojvodina so he would no longer bite. The events that followed further 
showed the naivety of these views and a deep unfamiliarity with Serbian 
hegemonic politics. In his journey, Milošević had clearly understood that in 
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order to make the necessary legal changes in relation to Kosovo, its politi-
cal leadership had to be removed. International authors state that the first 
step in this direction was taken with the dismissal of two Albanian lead-
ers Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari. According to them, this was done 
in order to replace these figures with more cooperative figures to destroy 
the autonomy (Malcolm, 1998; Petritsch, Pichler, 2002). In this context, 
in early 1989, the Milošević regime had achieved its goal of imposing its 
power within the federation. Because the political system of Yugoslavia 
was quite complicated, it consisted of six republics and two provinces 
which had their right to vote within the federation, (with the right for veto 
in Republics) now after their submission with the changes in Vojvodina, 
Montenegro and Kosovo’s leadership, Milošević had four votes out of a 
total eight. However, in Kosovo "happened" as Milošević liked to say "an 
event where the main protagonist was the people". But this time the main 
protagonist was the Albanian people. Thus, immediately after February 20, 
1989, two days before the adoption of the Serbian constitution in Kosovo, 
massive protests burst out from the Albanians which were also joined by 
the miners of the Trepça Industrial Complex (Meier, 1999). They arrived 
from Mitrovica (Stantrg) to Prishtina on foot in the afternoon after traveling 
for forty kilometres. They came to support Kosovo’s leadership, to oppose 
dismissals and changes, to express opposition to any pressure on Kosovo 
and its political leadership. The miners did not stop, and on February 20, 
1989, they entered in a hunger strike which was followed by the involve-
ment of others as well as by the leadership of Trepça (Vllasi, 2017). The 
support of the people was maximal. They bravely inspired hundreds of 
thousands by acting in cold snowy weather for five full days, and they tried 
to prove through their behavior that Albanians were not as they were being 
presented by Serbs…, all this manifestation with a participation of more 
than 400.000 people went without any single incident, without the break of 
even a single small window, and to achieve this, an amount of self-control, 
education and extraordinary awareness was needed. So, the idea was to 
clearly state the opinion of who Albanians were and what they represented. 
We are not as you decide to present us, we do not violate, and we do not 
kill but we express our political will only "with dignity" which is different 
from you Serbs (Clark, 2000). The Trepça miners’ hunger strike became 
a symbol of Kosovo Albanians resistance. Milan Kučan, the leader of the 
Slovenian Republic, came out openly in defense of the miners, address-
ing the Slovenian citizens, among other things: "The strikers are not only 
defending Albanians in Kosovo, they are defending Yugoslavia and every 
Republic, including Slovenia." (Norma, Macqueen, 1995). Despite the wide 
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national protests, the hunger strikers did not manage to attain their goal and 
stop the Milošević’s open aim to suppress Kosovo. In this regard, he took 
measures to narrow the legal power in Kosovo which was done through 
the amendment of the 1974 constitution, which would enable Kosovo to 
be forcefully reintegrated within the legal and political system of Serbia. 
According to Malcom (1998), changing these amendments would allow 
Serbia to control the police, the judiciary, and social, political, economic 
and educational power, the usage of only one official language. For the 
realization of this project, the Serbian government, under extraordinary 
circumstances on March 23, 1989, forced the Kosovo parliament to vote 
the constitutional amendments in a voting full of tension, an event that the 
Western authors5 describe their writings as a complete siege, the entire par-
liament surrounded by tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, special police 
units, members of state security, senior Serbian party officials, etc. This 
event was comparable to the event when Adolf Hitler took absolute power 
in 1933. In these circumstances the suppression of autonomy waited only 
for the official confirmation from Belgrade, wherewith a voting was held 
in an extraordinary and solemn session held on March 28, 1989 where 
Kosovo’s autonomy had been abolished and now had only been left in the 
memory of Albanians. The Albanian response was immediate and intense 
to the ongoing successive measures taken by Belgrade, including here: the 
continuation of massive protests whose demands were politically rational 
based on the events that where ocurring in Yugoslavia. The Austrian authors 
W. Petritsch and R. Pichler (2002) came to the conclusion that the Albanians 
with these protest clearly wanted to show that they had no separatist or 
nationalist intentions as it was continuously claimed by Serbian propaganda.
7. Gazimestan – the place of myths and legends
 To those who were familiar with the functioning of federation, the 
abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy on March 23, 1989 was a clear signal that 
Yugoslavia was no longer the same. Even for those who at certain moments 
had dilemmas and "often they had put the blame" on the Albanian nation-
alism. With the abolition of the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina and with the change of leadership in Montenegro, it was clear 
that Serbia and its leader Milošević had become a serious threat to the 
further continuation of Yugoslavia. In this regard, Milošević, supported 
strongly by the Serbian propaganda, had manipulated the masses with the 
organization of successive rallies, where Kosovo Serbs were the most active. 
5 Malcolm, 1998, 357-358; Petritsch, R. Pichler, 2002, 52; Judah, 2002, 81; Clark, 2000, 
52; Bugajski, 2006, 24. Schmit, 2012, 243.
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Milošević, now elected president of Serbia, was planning an even bigger 
rally because now they really had a reason: Kosovo was fully conquered 
and to celebrate this, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was 
an ideal chance. Preparations for the anniversary began a year earlier and 
were accompanied by numerous articles in the media, emphasizing that the 
celebration of the Battle of Kosovo was taking place "in the crucial years 
of our history" (Zirojevic, 1999). Lenard J. Cohen (2010) describes it as 
one of the most dramatic and well-prepared events according to a careful 
scenography in modern Serbian history.
 This manifestation was one of the most important, if not the most 
important in Serbian history. Due to the fact that the dissatisfaction with the 
political situation that prevailed at that time gave the Serbian state, more 
specifically Milošević, the opportunity to revive the Primary National Myth. 
The day of celebration begun early. At 7:00 AM, a liturgy was held in the 
monastery of Graçanica near the capital city Prishtina. The celebration then 
moved to the site of the historic Battlefield. The Serbian public seemed 
moved by feelings similar to massive hysteria (Kaser, Halpern, 1998). The 
participation was massive, with large numbers of 500.000 up to 1.5 mil-
lion Serbs coming from across the Federation and a significant number 
coming from the Serbian Diaspora. Serbian leader Milošević arrived by 
helicopter on "Vidovdan" on June 28, 1989, landing near a large crowd, 
straight from the sky like Messiah. "Everything seemed perfect". The first 
row was reserved for the political elite where the Serbian heads of state 
and the head of Yugoslavia were lined up (Cohen, 2010; Vllasi, 2017). It 
was clear that all the attention was on Milošević, the masses where filled 
with his portrait pictures and were shouting continuously: "Slobo – Slobo!", 
"Kosovo is Serbia!". He was the main speaker, he seemed confident and very 
excited by the masses and the opera music playing at the same time in the 
background with the Serbian patriotic song: "’Ko to kaže, ‘ko to laže, Srbija 
je mala…" (That who said that Serbia is small, has lied), Milošević came 
in front of the audience and gave a long speech which was evident that it 
was prepared in details. The content of the speech seemed quite fluctuating, 
there were cases where he talked about the path of unification, brother-
hood, economic reforms, the common good etc., such as: "Today’s Serbia 
is united and equal to other republics, and is prepared to do everything to 
economically improve the position of all its citizens. If there is unity, coop-
eration and seriousness, we will succeed in doing so. Serbs have always 
liberated themselves and when they had a chance they also helped others 
be liberated. Serbs have never taken advantage of their majority against 
others. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can only survive 
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in conditions of full equality for all nations living in it. Or the real side of 
the speech that contained nationalist elements that really showed his real 
intentions for Serbia to dominate and suppress the Federation. His speech 
introduction would start with the expression: ‘Friends’ (communist saluta-
tion) a typical greeting of the time, to continue the intoxicating expression of 
the masses ‘in this place-heart of Serbia’. This six-hundred-year anniversary 
is taking place at a time when Serbia, after many years and decades, has 
regained its state, national and spiritual integrity. Six centuries from then, 
we are here again engaged in battles and strife. These are not armed bat-
tles however such things cannot be excluded yet.6 It was obvious that the 
speech clearly showed the ultra-nationalist approach with which Milošević 
manipulated the memories of a famous loss to ignite hatred of the crowds 
against non-Serb people, especially against Albanians. In this aspect, let 
consider for a moment the Battle from a historical perspective. It is clear that 
historians do not always agree on how to interpret the events or the subject 
of their study, sometimes for personal, political, or ideological reasons or 
the discovery of new evidence and resources, etc. The Battle of Kosovo 
does not make an exception to such disagreements. However, the histori-
cal data that managed to survive till our time, such as references, various 
chronicles on which the story of the Battle of Kosovo is built upon which 
are mostly Ottoman and Byzantine, almost unanimously speake of a coali-
tion of Balkan people composed of Serbs, Albanians, Croats, Romanians, 
Bulgarians etc., led by Princ Lazar, ruler of the Serbs of Raška.
 In this context, the history of the Battle of Kosovo from the time it 
happened until today is one of the key events in the history of people of 
Balkans in particular for Albanians as native people of this region and Serbs 
as claimants of the territory of Kosovo. The issue seemed to be compli-
cated by the fact that Serbian mythology had given this the importance of 
a totem in the creation of an identity that the Serbian patriotism has held 
itself for centuries and which unfortunately continues to hold to this day 
(Pulaha, 1968). Many Serbian scientists and publicists have made a sig-
nificant contribution to this, thus establishing the scientific advantage of 
interpreting the "Serbian right over Kosovo" which was in fact taken as the 
task of Serbian historiography to prove this theory to the European public. 
In this context, there is actually no author that has written something about 
Kosovo without writing a few words on this Battle. The American historian, 
Ferdinand Schevill, (2002), finds that the facts about the Battle of Kosovo 
6 Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) Online from: https://archive.org/details/
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are so distorted by the legends of the South Slavs that the truth about this 
battle will never be revealed.
8. The Serbization of Kosovo – The Albanian Resistance
The events that took place in the following two decades, the end of 80s 
and 1998-1999 respectively, made Kosovo gain the attention it has today 
in western diplomacy.7 The cause for this is found in the political and 
legal aggression of Milošević’s regime, initially with the abolition of the 
autonomy which ended any form of cooperation between Albanians and 
Serbs in Kosovo, further contributing to increase in centuries-old diver-
gences that existed between them, to continue with a systematic violence 
that took place in 90s. In such a reality, without having many solutions, the 
majority of Albanians under the leadership of DLK (Democratic League of 
Kosovo) led by Ibrahim Rugova, had clearly stated that the path they would 
follow was that of peace, boycotting all Serbian institutions. It should be 
said that such a policy was strongly encouraged by the United States and 
the governments of Western Europe so that the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo 
would follow the moderate non-violent path, perhaps as the best possible 
way to achieve their goals.
The pacifist policy pursued by I. Rugova resulted with Kosovo remain-
ing at peace during the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. The argument 
offered by the DLK leadership at the time was that in those circumstances 
in which Albanians found themselves, especially after the suspension of all 
security institutions and without army and police, unarmed confrontation 
with the Serbs would be completely unequal and would bring great blood-
shed for the Albanians. However, this was not the whole picture, since even 
in these early times there existed a more or less modest group which paved 
an alternative way for the solution to the problem of Kosovo. The growth 
of these formations was increasing day by day, as a result of the increase 
in the number of those who had lost patience and confidence in the strategy 
of the peaceful movement and who were seriously considering resistance. 
In this context, in the mid 90s, the resistance took a shape in the name of 
what would be known publicly as the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). In 
such a situation, due to the brutality of the Serbian military police forces, 
the tendency to eradicate the innocent Albanians civilian population, had 
obliged the Western Europe and the United States to get more involved 
in this conflict, intervening militarily with the 78-day campaign of the 
7 The British journalist Tim Judah has a different opinion when talking about the histo-
rical developments of 1989 and onwards in Kosovo, it is strange how little is known 
about those years outside the region itself. T. Judah, 2002, 90.
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NATO Atlantic Alliance because the issue was not only about the stability 
of Kosovo but of the entire Balkans region (Daalder, E O`Hanlon, 2000).
9. Conclusion
 Considering it from an international point of view, Yugoslavia has 
always shown interest in the outside world, perhaps due to the combina-
tion that represented interethnic religious differences. All merits for the 
functioning of its survival formula are dedicated to the Yugoslav leader 
Josip Bros – Tito. However, the classic question that kept popping up 
continuously about Yugoslavia was: What will happen when Tito dies? 
Circumstances and events that were continuously taking place led to a 
gloomy end which was its breakup. The main dilemma was whether this 
process would be violent or democratic. Time has shown that Tito’s death 
caused deep wounds within the party. True political life had stalled, turn-
ing into a constant quarrel between the representatives of republics and of 
provinces, especially that of Kosovo.
During the 1980s, tensions in Kosovo increased every day more. Of the 
many problems that would arise, the Albanian-Serbian conflict could be 
called the basis for the beginning of the fall of Yugoslavia. Tito’s death is 
considered as the opening of the lid for the pot in which the Albanian-Serbian 
conflict was boiling.
For Albanians, their entire journey within the Yugoslavian federation 
was difficult and above all it was an imposed process. The Serbian regime, 
using all the power of Yugoslav government, had utilized violence, dis-
crimination, attempts to assimilate, pressure for displacement, and denial 
of basic human rights, especially against the Albanians. Its purpose was 
the serbization of Kosovo.8 Therefore, the 1974 Constitution that granted 
Kosovo an extended autonomy of power in all respects was a window of 
hope, though not enough, as Kosovo continued to be the poorest region in 
Yugoslavia in all aspects of life. These and many other facts rightly contrib-
uted to the Albanian nationalism resulting in intensive efforts of the leader-
ship of Albanian students at the beginning of the year 1981 (March-April), 
who organized protests which were joined by tens of thousands of citizens 
(workers, pupils, farmers). The demands of the protesters were clear: equal-
ity with other people of the federation, indicating demands for Kosovo to 
become a Republic. However, such a request, although just, was contra-
dicted by the Serbian regime. The point was that the Serbs could never 
withstand the emancipation of the Albanians, let alone being equal to them. 
Unfortunately, such a policy continues to this day in the new reality created 
8 Read more details on the Serbian project from Načertanija 1844 to Operation "Patkoi", 1999. 
102
KROATOLOGIJA 11 (2020.) broj 2
after February 17th 2008 when Kosovo was declared an Independent State 
and has received international recognition.
On the other hand, the Serbs have continuously criticized the Yugoslavian 
leadership. According to them, the policy led by Tito (from 1943 of the Jajca 
meeting and to the 1974 Constitution) had severely damaged the Serbian 
nation. In this context, the Serbian intellectual elite, using these arguments, 
had begun to use the card of nationalism. The SASA Memorandum was 
a clear narrative of the path that Serbian politics should follow, using the 
card of instrumentalization, for the allegedly "discrimination of Serbian 
population within the federation". In these circumstances, the most active 
were the Kosovo Serbs.9 They complained that "Albanians were raping and 
discriminating them by making life impossible for them in Kosovo". Their 
complaints to the Serbian leadership were that "if you do not intervene 
today, it will be too late tomorrow. As a result of the violence, Serbs will 
be forced to leave Kosovo". The leader in the east, Slobodan Milošević, 
responded to these requests by implementing his nationalist politics which 
he launched in April 1987 in Kosovo. With his rise to power, hopes for a 
life together in the federation were increasingly lost, thus, this being the 
first step towards the Breakup of Yugoslavia. The abolition of Kosovo’s 
autonomy on March 23, 1989, was a clear signal that Serbian policy would 
not stop in Kosovo but would continue in the direction of other Yugoslavian 
people. The course of events was followed by wars, massacres, and expul-
sion, hundreds of thousands killed, tens of thousands of missing people 
who first left for Slovenia, then Croatia, and Bosnia, to end with Kosovo, 
where it begun in the late 1980s. In this context, opinions may be differ-
ent, but in the course of events I have presented and analyzed in this paper, 
the tragedy of the Yugoslavian people and its cause is to be blamed to the 
Serbian nationalism led by Slobodan Milošević.
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Početak raspada Jugoslavije – Kosovo kao početna točka
Sažetak
Ovaj rad sadrži kronološki rezime i analizira proces početka ras-
pada Jugoslavije u vezi s događajima na Kosovu u razdoblju 1981. – 1989. 
Njegova svrha je predstaviti, kroz objektivan pristup, glavne uzroke koji 
su doveli do početka raspada Jugoslavije s Kosovom kao početnom toč-
kom. Metodologija toga rada uključuje reflektiranje glavnih događaja u 
obliku usporedne analize, uspoređivanjem stavova većega broja međuna-
rodnih i lokalnih autora (Albanaca, Hrvata, Srba) uključujući povjesničare, 
diplomate, političare, novinare i ostale - a neki od njih su bili neposredni 
pratitelji ovoga razdoblja. Analiza je provedena na znanstvenim radovima, 
monografijama i dokumentarnim filmovima.
Ključne riječi: Jugoslavija, Kosovo, autonomija, sukob, srpski nacionali-
zam, Miloševićev režim.
